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Formula Apportionment, Tax Competition, and the Provision of Local
Goods
Santiago M. Pinto∗
January 14, 2005

Abstract
The paper develops an analytical framework where regional governments strategically determine the structure
of the corporate profit tax system and profits are regionally allocated using an apportionment formula. Two
important results emerge in a symmetric Nash equilibrium: (i) investment decisions are distorted, i.e., regional
governments will not allow complete deduction of capital costs from taxable corporate profits; and (ii) there
is underprovision of the good provided by the regional government, consistent with the literature on property
tax competition. The paper also shows that the degree of underprovision may be less severe when the formula
employs sales shares to apportion corporate profits. The model allows us to presume that the recent shift by
most states in the U.S. towards a formula apportionment that gives a higher weight to the sales proportion
may constitute a welfare improvement for all regions, compared to the original formula that weighs all factors
equally.

1

Introduction.

If a corporation has business activities established in multiple jurisdictions, regions, or countries,1
then the local authority can levy a tax on income generated in that location. However, measuring
income earned within each region presents a difficult conceptual problem. For instance, the
current system of corporate taxation in the European Union requires firms to maintain different
accounts for its activities in each country where it operates. The U.S. and Canada, on the other
hand, have adopted a system of formula apportionment (FA) to allocate income across states,
which relies on observable factors. FA, as used in the U.S., asserts that the proportion of a
multi-regional firm’s income earned in a given state is a weighted average of the proportion of
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the firm’s total sales, property, and payroll in that state. Thus, the firm’s activities in a specific
region is approximated by the share of these factors in the region, so the firm is not required to
keep different accounts. Specifically, the tax due by a firm to state i is
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(1)

where K i , W i , and F i are property, payroll, and sales in state i, respectively; K, W , and F
are total domestic property, payroll, and sales of the firm respectively; mij is the weight given
to factor j = K, W, F , in the apportionment formula in state i; Ωi represents the firm’s taxable
profits as defined by state i’s tax law; and ti is state i’s tax rate.2 Table 1 shows the weights
mij chosen by different states in the U.S. As it can be observed, there does not exist a single
principle followed by all states.
However, this method of apportionment is not, by all means, neutral in terms of its
economic effects. If states adopt the same apportionment formula, exactly 100 percent of a
corporation’s income will be apportioned across states. Non-uniformity, however, can result in
more or less than 100 percent of a corporation’s income being subject to state income tax. In
an effort to encourage tax uniformity across jurisdictions, the Multi-state Tax Compact in 1967
established that the three factors considered in the apportionment formula are to be weighted
equally (miK = miW = miS for all regions i). In spite of this, most states have recently
deviated from the uniform apportionment formula and moved towards a greater weight on the
sales portion of the corporate income tax, as it is clear from Table 1. It has been claimed that
by manipulating the formula in this way, officials can offer tax breaks that help the economic
development of the region. However, if more states pass such legislation, other states will be
compelled to do the same, initiating a ”race to the bottom”, in which all states end up imposing
the same (lower) tax liability.
The apportionment of a firm’s total profits across states creates complicated incentive
effects. On one hand, firms operating in different regions will react to different formulas by
changing the allocation of property, sales and workers across regions. On the other hand, given
that the tax policy chosen by different regional governments affects residents of other states,
some kind of strategic interaction can be expected. The present paper develops a model that
incorporates these effects and analyzes how different formulas affect the provision of regional
goods. In our analytical framework, each government can endogenously choose both the corporate tax rate and the corporate tax base. The latter is basically determined by the proportion
2 Regional
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of capital costs that can be deducted from taxable income. In a closed economy, with no crossborder ownership and, consequently, no tax competition, the regional government chooses not
to distort investment, i.e., it will allow full deduction of capital costs from taxable income.
However, the paper concludes that if a firm operates in many regions at the same time and
regional governments interact strategically, investment decisions end up being distorted, i.e., it
is optimal to allow only imperfect deduction of capital costs. The paper also shows that there is
underprovision of the good provided by the regional authority,3 and even more interestingly, it
demonstrates that the degree of underprovision is more severe when the apportionment formula
employs capital shares (or a linear combination of capital and sales shares) compared to one that
exclusively uses sales shares. Hence, the shift towards a FA with only sales shares, as evidenced
in the U.S., would increase the country’s economic welfare according to our model.
Even though there seems to be a great interest in the strategic determination of apportionment formulas among regional governments, only recently this issue has been formally examined.
The earlier papers by McClure (1980) and McClure (1981) and Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1985)
first elucidated that formulary apportionment mostly transforms the state corporate income tax
into three separate taxes on the factors in the apportionment formula. Gordon and Wilson
(1986) examine the response of firms to a system of formula apportionment, restricting attention to cases in which all states use the same system, with different corporate tax rates. Most
of their analysis is concerned with the component of the tax tied to the allocation of property.
Anand and Sansing (2000) provide an explanation for why states choose different apportionment
formulas, even though aggregate social welfare is maximized when states use the same formulas.
They demonstrate analytically that “importing” states have incentives to increase sales factor
weights, while “exporting” states have incentives to reduce the weights on productive factors.
This literature is mostly concerned with the allocation of corporate income across states within
a given country. However, the conclusions also apply to the relationship between multinational
enterprises and national tax systems, in particular, the allocation of foreign direct investment
across countries.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes the optimal corporate
tax rates and tax bases chosen by regional governments in a closed economy: each region has
a local firm and a FA system is not required. In this section we assume that the ownership of
the firm is entirely in the hands of the local residents. In Section 3, we consider the case of a
3 Given
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multi-regional firm with cross-border ownership, and study the incentive effects of a FA system.
In Section 4 we derive the optimal corporate tax policy under different FA systems. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.

2

The Bencchmark Case: No Cross-Border Ownership

Before analyzing the effects of a FA system and to understand its implications better, we derive
the optimal corporate tax policy in a very simple case.4 The model considers an economy
with two identical regions, A and B.5 An homogeneous consumption good xi , which serves
as the numéraire, is locally produced by a firm operating exclusively in region i. There is a
representative immobile consumer-investor in each jurisdiction. The ownership of the firm is
entirely in the hands of the local consumer. Capital is the only variable factor, it is in perfectly
elastic supply, and can be rented at an exogenous rate r. Output is determined by the production
function f i = f (k i ), which is identical across regions, and satisfies fk > 0, fkk < 0.6 Gross profits
in each region i are given by Πi = f (k i ) − rk i .
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of x and from a local good publicly provided g i . Preferences are represented by a strictly quasi-concave utility function ui = u(xi , g i ),
where uij > 0 represents the marginal utility of good j = x, g. The latter is locally financed
by a tax on corporate profits.7 The firm’s after tax profits accrue entirely to the representative
consumer in each region and constitute the only source of income.
Standard corporate profit tax models assume that taxable corporate profits differ from
economic profits in many different and complicated ways. As in Gordon and Wilson (1986), we
assume for simplicity that this discrepancy is basically determined by the imperfect deductibility
of capital expenditures from taxable income. We depart from their approach in that we assume
that the regional government can manipulate the deduction policy, i.e. each region has control
over the corporate tax base by choosing different deduction policies. Specifically, the tax base in
region i is the value of output minus a fixed share µi of the true capital cost.8 The deductibility
4A

similar model, in a slightly different context, can be found in Haufler and Schjelderup (2000). The framework is useful as a
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6 It is assumed that there is an implicit fixed factor that gives rise to pure profits in each region. We can think of this factor as
being entrepreneurial services.
7 In this model, the regional government does not have any other tax instrument available. It can only use a tax on corporate
profits to finance the publicly provided good.
8 The value of µi will depend on the details of the tax rules and tax laws in region i, and it will have the potential to influence
the firm’s behavior, in particular, the location of its business activity. Hines (1997, 1999) provides a critical survey of the literature
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of capital expenses for tax purposes can either be above or below its true costs. Most tax systems
allow only incomplete deduction of capital costs, or µi < 1, which means that a positive tax is
also levied on capital. For µi = 1, the corporate tax falls only on pure profits, and when µi > 1
capital is subsidized. Thus, taxable income as computed by region i, Ωi , and economic profits
Πi are related as follows:
Ωi = f (k i ) − µi rk i = Πi + (1 − µi )rk i .

(2)

Taxes paid by the firm to region i, T i = ti Ωi , are
T i = ti [Πi + (1 − µi )rk i ],

(3)

while net profits N i = Πi − T i can be expressed as
N i = (f i − rk i )(1 − ti ) − ti (1 − µi )rk i .
2.1

(4)

The firm’s problem

A firm in region i chooses9 the level of k i which maximizes net profits for a given tax policy. The
problem consists of maximizing N i with respect to k i . From the FOC we obtain the expression
fki − r =

ti (1 − µi )r
(1 − ti )

(5)

that implicitly defines k i as a function of ti , µi , and r. It is then straightforward to derive the
firm’s reaction to changes in ti and µi :
∂k i
(1 − µi )r
=
,
∂ti
fkk (1 − ti )2
∂k i
−ti r
=
.
∂µi
fkk (1 − ti )

and

(6)
(7)

An increase in the tax rate will drive capital out of the region if µi < 1, and will attract capital
if µi > 0. For 0 < ti < 1, a higher value of µi will create an inflow of capital to region i.
2.2

The government’s problem

The regional or state government determines the values of ti and µi that maximize the consumer’s
utility U i ≡ U (xi , g i ), given that xi = N i and g i = ti Ωi .10 The optimal levels of the choice
that studies behavioral responses to different regional tax rules, focusing on multinational firms.
9 As consumer i owns the firm, this is essentially a decision made by her.
10 We will only consider corporate tax rates that satisfy 0 < ti < 1.
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variables satisfy the following FOC conditions:
∂U i /∂ti ≡ Uxi (∂xi /∂ti ) + Ugi (∂g i /∂ti ) = 0,

(8)

∂U i /∂µi ≡ Uxi (∂xi /∂µi ) + Ugi (∂g i /∂µi ) = 0,

(9)

where
∂xi /∂ti = −Ωi < 0,

∂xi /∂µi = ti rk i > 0,

i
(1 − ti )(∂k i /∂ti )2 ,
∂g i /∂µi = Ωi + fkk

∂g i /∂µi = −ti rk i (1 + εi ),

and εi denotes the elasticity of capital with respect to ti evaluated at the optimal values of
{ti , µi }, i.e., εi = (ti /k i )(∂k i /∂ti ). In order for a solution to exist, |εi | < 1, otherwise both
(∂xi /∂µi ) and (∂g i /∂µi ) would be positive and ∂U i /∂µi > 0. The optimality conditions can be
rewritten as follows:
M RS i = −

∂xi /∂ti
∂xi /∂µi
=
−
∂g i /∂ti
∂g i /∂µi

(10)

where M RS i = Ugi /Uxi . The marginal cost of increasing g i is measured in terms of units of xi
that should be sacrificed. The optimal combination {ti , µi } is achieved when these costs are
equalized for every tax instrument.
An important implication of this model is that investment decisions should not be distorted. In other words, µi should be set equal to one.11 Substituting the corresponding expressions into (10) and simplifying we obtain
i
Ωi (ti /k i )(∂k i /∂ti ) = fkk
(1 − ti )(∂k i /∂ti )2 .

(11)

This last equation is only satisfied when ∂k i /∂ti = 0, which implies that µi = 1. Thus, from
(5), it becomes clear that fk = r, so investment decisions are not distorted. The following
proposition summarizes our findings so far.
Proposition 1. When there is no cross-border ownership, µi should be set equal to one, so that
investment decisions are not distorted at the optimal combination {ti , µi }.

3

The Formula Apportionment Model

We now assume that x is produced by a multi-regional firm (i.e., a firm that operates in both
regions), and that the consumer residing in region i owns a proportion θi of that firm. The
11 For

this conclusion to hold we also need 0 < ti < 1.
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two identical regions or countries A and B constitute a common market. The only difference
with respect to the previous analysis is that the multi-regional firm can shift capital across
regions. Total output (or total sales) is given by f (k A ) + f (k B ), and gross profits by Π =
f (k A ) + f (k B ) − rk, where k = k A + k B . As before, each regional government provides a
good that is financed with a tax on corporate profits. The firm’s after tax profits are entirely
distributed among consumers according to the “ownership” shares, and constitutes the only
source of income.
The multi-regional firm pays profit taxes to each regional government where it operates.
Both regions adopt a FA method to calculate the share of the firm’s activities in each jurisdiction.
These shares determine the distribution of tax revenues across regions. The regions do not
necessarily adopt formulas of the same type, i.e., each region may employ different shares, in
addition to different corporate tax rates.12 Moreover, they may not even add up to one. The
analytical framework analyzes FA tax regimes that consider sales, property, or a combination of
the two factors as proxies of the firm’s activities in each state. Hence, these shares ultimately
depend on k A and k B . Let α(k A , k B )[β(k A , k B )] denote the share of the firm’s activities in region
A[B]. In addition, we assume that tax shares add up to unity, i.e., α(k A , k B ) + β(k A , k B ) = 1.13
For instance, if only capital shares are considered in the apportionment formula, then mAK = 1
in equation (1), so α(k A , k B ) will become
αK = k A /k,

(12)

where αK is the capital (or property) share in region A. Moreover, β K = (1 − αK ) denotes
the corresponding proportion of capital in region B. On the other hand, if the apportionment
formula exclusively weighs output shares, mAF = 1, and α(k A , k B )14 is defined by
αF = f (k A )/[f (k A ) + f (k B )]

(13)

where αF is the output share in region A and β F = (1 − αF ) denotes the corresponding share
in region B. If plants produce for the local markets where they are located, outputs and sales
are equivalent, and αF [β F ] also represents sales shares.15
As in the previous section, the tax base in region i is the value of output minus a fixed
12 The

choice of the specific formula can be determined on the basis of strategic considerations or bilateral agreements. Our model

takes the choice of the FA as given and analyzes the consequences of using different FA systems when the corporate profit tax rates
and tax bases are strategically determined.
13 Pethig and Wagener (2003) call such regimes “uniform FA tax systems”.
14 For notational simplicity, we will just write it α hereafter.
15 This weight is consistent with a tax at the origin. Given that in our setting regions are identical, in a symmetric equilibrium
exports and imports will be zero.
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share µi of the true capital cost. Hence, the firm is allowed to deduct a proportion µ of its capital
costs, where µ is defined as µ = αK µA + β K µB . Denoting by ti region i’s statutory corporate
profit tax rate, and t = αtA + βtB the effective tax rate, then the firm’s total tax burden under
FA is given by
T = t[f (k A ) + f (k B ) − µrk]
= t[Π + (1 − µ)rk]
= tΩ,

(14)

where Ω is the tax base. As a result, after-tax profits N = Π − T are
N = (1 − t)Π − t(1 − µ)rk.

(15)

The sequence of events is as follows: (i) the regional governments announce their tax
policy, i.e. they announce the corporate tax rate (ti ) and tax base (determined by µi ) for a
given FA system; (ii) the firm observes the tax policy chosen by each state and allocates capital
across regions; (iii) g i and xi are determined and payoffs are realized.
3.1

Firm’s Profit Maximization

It will result very useful to compare the impact of a change in ti on k A , k B and k under the
special FAs mentioned before, i.e., when α is αK , αF , or any combination of the two factors.
To do so, we first determine how the multi-regional firm allocates capital between jurisdictions.
Consider the case of a general apportionment formula.The firm maximizes (15) by choosing k A
and k B taking the tax policy as given. The FOCs for an interior solution are
t(1 − µA )
αA (tA − tB )
r+
Ω,
(1 − t)
(1 − t)
t(1 − µB )
βB (tB − tA )
fkB − r =
r+
Ω,
(1 − t)
(1 − t)

fkA − r =

(16)
(17)

where αA = (∂α/∂k A ) > 0, and βB = (∂β/∂k B ) > 0. If µA = µB = µ = 1, the previous
conditions become (fki − r) = αi Π[(ti − tj )/(1 − t)] (for i, j = 1, 2). Compared to the results in
Section 2, there is now an additional term which affects capital allocation between jurisdictions
when different corporate tax rates are adopted by local authorities. In this case, capital will be
optimally allocated between regions only if tA = tB = t.
The comparative static results under different FA systems with respect to tax rates are
hard to obtain because the firm does not only influence the tax base, but also the effective tax

9

rate t by changing its capital allocation across regions. For instance, (∂t/∂k A ) = (tA − tB )αA ,
so the effective tax rate increases with k A if tA > tB , and decreases if tA < tB . In this section
we calculate the firm’s response to different ti s under full symmetry, i.e., when the two regions
are completely identical, and they choose the same tax rates (tA = tB = t) and tax bases
B
A
. As a
= fkk
(µ = µA = µB ). These assumptions imply that k A = k B = k/2 and fkk = fkk

result,


α(1 − µ)
∂k A
1
r + αA Ω ,
=
∂tA
(1 − t)fkk (1 − t)


∂k B
α(1 − µ)
1
r − βB Ω .
=
∂tA
(1 − t)fkk (1 − t)

(18)
(19)

Similar expressions can be obtained for tB . In a symmetric equilibrium α = β = 1/2, and
αA = βB . Note that when µ = 1, |(∂k A /∂tA )| = (∂k B /∂tA ) > 0.16 If µ < 1, total capital is
reduced as tA increases, (∂k/∂tA ) < 0.
When αK [β K ] and αF [β F ] are the shares in the formula,
kB
,
k2
f B fkA
F
,
αA
=
F2
K
αA
=

kA
,
k2
f A fkB
βBF =
,
F2

βBK =

(20)
(21)

and in a symmetric equilibrium,
1
,
2k
fk
F
αA
.
= βBF =
4f

K
αA
= βBK =

(22)
(23)

Given that production exhibits decreasing returns to scale, average product is always greater
K
F
> αA
. Thus, |∂k A /∂tA |αK >
than marginal product, or f /(k/2) > fk , which implies that αA

|∂k A /∂tA |αF , so that capital in A is less responsive to a change in tA when α = αF . Moreover,
if net profits are positive, i.e., N > 0,17 and α = αK , then
αK (1 − µ)
r − βBK Ω < 0,
(1 − t)

(24)

and (∂k B /∂tA )αK > 0. On the other hand, the expression (∂k B /∂tA )αF is in general ambiguous,
but |(∂k B /∂tA )αF | < (∂k B /∂tA )αK always hold, so the impact of a change in tA on capital in
region B is largest (in absolute value) under a FA which gives full weight to the property share.
The comparative static results with respect to µA (and µB ) are less complicated to derive.
16 Remember
17 Net

that with no cross-border ownership and no strategic competition, ∂ki /∂ti = 0 when µ = 1.
profits should be positive in our setup because this is the only source of income of the representative consumer.
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It can be shown that, under full symmetry,
∂k A
tr
> 0,
= −
A
∂µ
fkk (1 − t)
∂k B
= 0.
∂µA

and

(25)
(26)

An increase in µA attracts more capital to A and does not affect the amount of capital allocated
to region B. Remember that higher values of µA imply a lower tax on capital (or eventually a
subsidy on capital if µ becomes greater than one) due to the fact that capital costs cannot be
fully deducted from taxable income.

4

The Government’s Problem

Two different cases will be examined. First, it is assumed that each state considers the same
taxable income, i.e., µA = µB = µ, but strategically determines the corporate tax rate ti taking
the tax rate chosen by the other region as given. Next, we allow regional governments to also
compete on the level of µi . The analysis always focuses on symmetric Nash equilibria.
4.1

Strategic determination of corporate tax rates

Each regional government or country i maximizes the utility of its representative consumer by
choosing the statutory corporate tax rate ti treating the tax rate in the other jurisdiction as
given. For the moment, we assume that both regions follow the same tax policy regarding tax
bases, i.e., µA = µB = µ. The tax revenue is used to finance the provision of a regional good,
g i . For the tax authority in region A, the problem consists of maximizing U A ≡ U (xA , g A ) with
respect to tA subject to the government budget constraint, g A = tA αΩ, given that xA = θN ,
and viewing tB as parametric.18 From the FOC, we obtain the reaction function of the local
government in region A:
M RS A = −

∂xA /∂tA
.
∂g A /∂tA

(27)

The latter implicitly defines tA as a function of tB . A similar expression can be obtained for
region B. These two conditions jointly determine the equilibrium values of tA and tB . In a
18 Given

that we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, θ = θi , for i = A, B.
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symmetric equilibrium,
∂xA
= −θαΩ,
∂tA
"
2  B 2 #
∂k
∂k A
∂g A
+
.
= αΩ + t(1 − t)fkk
A
A
∂t
∂t
∂tA

(28)
(29)

As a consequence,
M RS A = θγ

(30)

where
γ=

αΩ

 > 1.
αΩ + t(1 − t)fkk (∂k A /∂tA )2 + (∂k B /∂tA )2

The previous condition holds for any FA system, i.e, α can be substituted by αK or αF , or
any convex combination of them. The tax rates are inefficiently low, or alternatively, there is
underprovision of the publicly provided good under FA if θγ > 1. On the other hand, there is
overprovision if θγ < 1.
We will now consider the effect of employing different FA systems. In a symmetric
equilibrium, the FAs considered in this paper determine the same equilibrium capital level in
both regions.19 Let γ l (l = F, K) be the value of γ in (30) that only uses production shares
(l = F ) or property shares (l = K) in the formula. Given that (∂k B /∂tA )αK > |(∂k B /∂tA )αF |,
and |∂k A /∂tA |αK > |∂k A /∂tA |αF , it is then evident that γ K > γ F as the denominator gets
smaller when α = αK . So for a given θ, M RS A |αK > M RS A |αF .
Consider a situation where tax rates are inefficiently low. Then, the degree of underprovision is more severe when α = αK compared to α = αF as M RS A |αK > M RS A |αF > 1. Thus,
a shift towards a (symmetric) FA under output shares actually constitutes an improvement
for the economy as a whole. In fact, it dominates, under the previous conditions, any convex
combination of capital and output shares. The reason is that capital becomes less responsive
to changes in tax rates when αF is used as opposed to αK . Therefore, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. When corporate tax rates are strategically chosen by regional governments, a
symmetric Nash Equilibrium is consistent with either efficient or inefficient levels of the publicly
provided good. If there is underprovision of the good when the FA is based exclusively on production shares, then there will also be underprovision under a FA which employs only property
19 When tA

= tB , conditions (16) and (17) are independent of the FA system chosen.
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shares, or any combination of the two. However, the underprovision will be less severe if the FA
gives full weight to production shares.
4.2

Strategic determination of both corporate tax rates and tax bases

Now suppose that the regional government can choose both the levels of ti and µi simultaneously
taking the tax instruments decided by the other jurisdiction as given. The local government of
region A determines the values of {tA , µA } which maximize U A ≡ U (xA , g A ), where g A = tA αΩ,
and xA = θN viewing {tB , µB } as parametrically. The FOCs of this problem are:
∂U A /∂tA ≡ UxA (∂xA /∂tA ) + UgA (∂g A /∂tA ) = 0,

(31)

∂U A /∂µA ≡ UxA (∂xA /∂µA ) + UgA (∂g A /∂µA ) = 0.

(32)

These two equations implicitly define tA and µA as a function of tB and µB . Similar expressions
can be obtain for region B. The four conditions determine a Nash equilibrium {tA , tB , µA , µB }.
Rearranging (31) and (32), we obtain
M RS A = −

∂xA /∂µA
∂xA /∂tA
=
−
,
∂g A /∂tA
∂g A /∂µA

(33)

which is equivalent to the condition derived in Section 2. The expressions for (∂xA /∂tA ) and
(∂g A /∂tA ) in a symmetric Nash Equilibrium were obtained before.20 The corresponding expressions for (∂xA /∂µA ) and (∂g A /∂µA ) are
∂xA /∂µA = θtrk A > 0,

(34)

∂g A /∂µA = −trk A (α + ε) ,

(35)

where ε = (t/k A )(∂k A /∂tA ) < 0 is the elasticity of capital with respect to the tax rate in
equilibrium. Notice that a solution for µA will exist if in equilibrium α > |ε|, i.e., in equilibrium
|ε| should be relatively small, in which case ∂g A /∂µA < 0. As a result,
M RS A =

θ
.
α+ε

(36)

Remember that α = 1/2 in a symmetric equilibrium. If θ = 1/2, which implies an equal
distribution of the multi-region corporate profits among residents, and given that ε < 0, then it
is straightforward to see from (36) that M RS A > 1, or equivalently, the good provided by the
regional government ends up being underprovided. Moreover, this result holds for any FA, i.e.,
α = αK , α = αF , or any convex combination, α = mK αK + mF αF , where mK + mF = 1. The
following proposition summarizes the result.
20 See

equations (28) and (29).
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Proposition 3. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium where corporate profits are equally distributed
among residents, i.e., θ = 1/2, there is underprovision of the publicly provided good.
We showed in Section 2 that when there is no strategic competition between regions,
and regional governments choose the optimal levels of ti and µi , full deduction of capital should
be allowed, i.e., µi = 1. However, when a firm can shift capital between regions, and regional
governments determined the corporate tax rate and tax base strategically, then they will choose
a value of µi that is less than one in any FA. The following proposition states formally this
result.21
Proposition 4. If regional governments choose both ti and µi (i = A, B), then in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium µi < 1 for any FA system.
Lowering the level of µi (in particular, choosing a value less than one), allows the regional
government to increase g i according to (35). On the other hand, we have concluded that a
symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by an underprovision of the publicly provided
good. As a result, the level of ti should then be lower than the optimal value of ti adopted
when µi = 1. Hence, the regional government opts to distort investment decisions by choosing
µi < 1 in order to reduce corporate tax rates and the incentive to shift the activities to the other
region.
Proposition 3 claims that there is underprovision of the publicly provided good. In
addition, it was established earlier (Proposition 2) that when there is underprovision, it will be
less severe if the FA completely relies on output (or sales) shares. This result also holds here.
Let M RS |αF be the MRS under a system of FA that only employs output shares, and M RS |αK
the MRS under a FA that relies exclusively on capital or property shares. Then, the following
expression is true
M RS |αK =

θ
α+

(t/k A )(∂k A /∂tA )αK

>

θ
α+

(t/k A )(∂k A /∂tA )αF

= M RS |αF > 1.

(37)

The first inequality holds because |(∂k A /∂tA )αF | < |(∂k A /∂tA )αK |, and the second results from
Proposition 3. Hence, the departure from the optimal provision of the regional goods is even
greater in this last scenario. The result is also valid for any FA that uses a linear combination
of property and output shares, in particular, the uniform FA suggested by the Multistate Tax
Compact in 1967 for the U.S. In our model, a uniform FA equally weighs the property and the
output shares, i.e. α = (1/2)αK + (1/2)αF . Thus, it is clear from our previous analysis that
M RS |αK > M RS |(1/2)αK +(1/2)αF > M RS |αF > 1.
21 The

proof is relegated to the Appendix.

(38)
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Proposition 5. The degree of underprovision is more important when the FA employs exclusively capital shares or a convex combination of capital and output shares, compared to a FA
that only uses sales shares to approximate the firm’s activities in the region.
Therefore, we conclude that the strategic determination of {ti , µi } by regional governments may result in corporate tax rates set at inefficiently low levels and tax systems that only
allow incomplete deduction of capital costs from the taxable income (i.e., µi < 1). Moreover,
the problem will become more serious as the FA relies more heavily on property shares to proxy
the firm’s activities in the region.

5

Conclusions

States and countries that employ a corporate profit tax to finance part of its activities face
the problem of measuring a corporation’s tax liability to each region. The use of a FA to
allocate income across locations introduces very complicated incentive effects for both the firms
that operate in different jurisdictions and for local governments that shape the structure of
the corporate tax system. In this paper we consider a tax competition model with respect to
corporate profit taxes and tax bases under different FA systems. We show that in a symmetric
equilibrium there is underprovision of the locally provided good due to the strategic interaction
between the governments. Local authorities choose to distort investment decisions, i.e., firms
are only allowed to deduct a portion of capital costs from taxable income, so that they can adopt
lower tax rates. This result does not hold in a closed economy with no cross-border ownership.
In this case, full deduction of capital costs is allowed and, consequently, investment decisions
are not distorted.
We also show that the degree of underprovision is less severe when the formula relies on
output shares. In our symmetric setup, these shares are equivalent to sales shares. Thus, we
claim that the recent shift by most states in the U.S. to a FA that gives more importance to
sales would constitute an improvement in terms of welfare for all regions.

A
A.1

Appendix.
Proof of Proposition

Proposition 6. If local governments choose both ti and µi (i = A, B), then in a symmetric Nash equilibrium µi < 1 for
any FA system.
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Proof. The FOCs (31) and (32) establish the values of tA and µA . Similar expressions determine tB and µB . Given that
we analyze a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., tA = tB = t and µA = µB = µ), the following analysis holds for both regions.
Suppose that µA = 1 and ∂U A /∂t = 0. We will show that ∂U A /∂µA < 0, so the FOCs are not satisfied. Thus, the
regional government can increase utility by choosing a lower µA . From (31)
UgA
∂xA /∂tA
=− A
.
A
Ux
∂g /∂µA

(39)


 A
 A

∂x /∂tA
∂g /∂µA
∂U A /∂µ = UxA (∂xA /∂µA ) 1 −
.
∂g A /∂tA
∂xA /∂µA

(40)

Hence, ∂U A /∂µ can be written as

Both UxA and ∂xA /∂µA are positive, so the sign of ∂U A /∂µ depends on the sign of the expression between brackets. It
can be shown that
∂xA /∂µA
∂xA /∂tA
>
,
A
A
∂g /∂t
∂g A /∂µA

(41)

so that the expressions between brackets is negative and ∂U A /∂µ < 0. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the LHS
of (41) is less than or equal to the RHS. Replacing, we obtain
−

θαΩ
θ
.
≤−
αΩ + t(1 − t)fkk [(∂kA /∂tA )2 + (∂kB /∂tA )2
α + (t/kA )(∂kA /∂tA )

(42)

Note that when µA = 1, ∂kA /∂tA = −∂kB /∂tA = αA Π/(1 − t)fkk < 0. Substituting these results into the last condition
and rearranging we reach the following expression
0 ≥ (1 − α) +

t ∂kA
kA ∂tA




2kA αA
−1 .
α

(43)

The first term on the RHS of (43) is positive, and the sign of the second term is determined by the sign of [(2kA αA /α)−1],
which is positive for any FA system:
K
= 1/2k. Given that in a
(i) Suppose that the FA gives full weight to property shares, i.e., α = αK = 1/2, and αA = αA

symmetric equilibrium 2kA = k, then 2kA αA /α = 1, so we reach a contradiction as the RHS of (43) is strictly positive.
F
= fk /4f , then 2kA αA /α = fk /[f /(k/2)].
(ii) If the FA gives full weight to output shares, i.e., α = αF = 1/2, and αA = αA

As the function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, fk /[f /(k/2)] < 1, which implies that the second term of (43) is
negative, contradicting our original claim.
We then conclude that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium µA (and consequently µB ) is less than one.
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STATE

Formula

STATE

Formula

ALABAMA

3 Factor

MONTANA

3 Factor

ALASKA

3 Factor

ARIZONA

Double weighted Sales

NEBRASKA
NEVADA

Sales
No State Income Tax

ARKANSAS

Double weighted Sales

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Double weighted Sales

CALIFORNIA

Double weighted Sales

NEW JERSEY (1)

Double weighted Sales

COLORADO
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE

3 Factor
Double weighted Sales
3 Factor

NEW MEXICO

Double weighted Sales

NEW YORK

Double weighted Sales

NORTH CAROLINA

Double weighted Sales

FLORIDA

Double weighted Sales

NORTH DAKOTA

GEORGIA

Double weighted Sales

OHIO

3 Factor
60 % Sales, 20 % Property/Payroll

HAWAII

3 Factor

OKLAHOMA

3 Factor

IDAHO

Double weighted Sales

OREGON (2)

Double weighted Sales
Triple weighted Sales

ILLINOIS

Sales

PENNSYLVANIA

INDIANA

Double weighted Sales

RHODE ISLAND

IOWA
KANSAS
KENTUCKY

Sales
3 Factor
Double weighted Sales

SOUTH CAROLINA

3 Factor
Double weighted Sales

SOUTH DAKOTA

No State Income Tax

TENNESSEE

Double weighted Sales

LOUISIANA

Double weighted Sales

TEXAS

MAINE

Double weighted Sales

UTAH

Sales
3 Factor

MARYLAND

Double weighted Sales

VERMONT

3 Factor

MASSACHUSETTS

Double weighted Sales

VIRGINIA

Double weighted Sales

MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA

90 % Sales, 5 % Property/Payroll
75% Sales, 12.5 % Property/Payroll

WASHINGTON

No State Income Tax

WEST VIRGINIA

Double weighted Sales

MISSISSIPPI

3 Factor

WISCONSIN

Double weighted Sales

MISSOURI

3 Factor

WYOMING

No State Income Tax

DIST. OF COLUMBIA

Table 1: Formulas for tax year 2003, as of January 1, 2003.

3 Factor

